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GATION.-In Rains v. Schutte, 53 Ill. App. 2d 214, 202 N.E.2d 660 (5th Dist.

1964), the Illinois Appellate Court considered the question of whether a
plaintiff has the right to move for exclusion, i.e., challenge for cause, of any

prospective jurors shown to be policyholders in a mutual insurance company
which carried the defendant's liability coverage. The court held that, upon a
good faith request by the plaintiff, prospective jurors, shown to be policyholders in the defendant's mutual insurance carrier, should be excluded from
the venire before voir dire interrogation.
In the Rains case, a personal injury action against the defendant
Schutte, the plaintiff made a pre-trial request for disclosure of the names

of any prospective jurors on the venire who were policyholders in the
Country Mutual Insurance Company, the defendant's liability carrier.
The defendant disclosed that seventeen members of the venire were insured with Country Mutual. The plaintiff then filed a pre-trial motion
to dismiss, for cause, the seventeen prospective jurors, or, in the alternative,
for permission to interrogate them on voir dire regarding their relationship with Country Mutual. Both requests were denied and during the
voir dire interrogation, the plaintiff was forced to utilize all his peremptory
challenges against those veniremen who were insured by Country Mutual.
He was unable, however, to prevent seven of the policyholders from being
impaneled on the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
On appeal,

the Illinois Appellate Court reversed

and remanded,

holding that the trial court should have granted plaintiff's motion and
excused for cause, without interrogation by the court or counsel, all jurors
on the venire who were insured by Country Mutual Insurance Company.
The court accepted the plaintiff's argument that it is against the fundamental concept of jury trials to allow a jury to decide issues in which the
jurors have financial interests. It also found that the plaintiff's motion
was made in good faith and, being made out of the presence of the venire,
indicated a proper reluctance to introduce the issue of insurance into the
case. The court concluded that sufficient evidence had been presented to
support the motion, inasmuch as the policy contained a clause providing

that:
This policy is on the mutual or participating plan and the
named insured, during the continuance of this policy shall be entitled to participate in such savings and earnings of the company as
the Board of Directors may determine to distribute to like policyholders. [Emphasis by the court.]'
The decision in the Rains case departs from the established trend of
Illinois cases and is the most recent in a series of decisions dealing generally
1 Rains v. Schutte, 53 Ill. App. 2d 214, 216, 202 N.E.2d 660, 661 (5th Dist. 1964).
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with the problem of eliminating jurors who have a pecuniary interest in
the issue being tried. Previously, where a possible pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case was shown to exist in the prospective veniremen,
no exclusion, prior to voir dire, was allowed. However, dictum in Smithers
v. Henriquez,2 indicated, in a negative way, that the Illinois Supreme
Court envisioned this possibility. In that case, the court felt that an
onerous and unreasonable burden would be imposed upon the litigants
if they were required to examine a jury list to determine the qualifications
of prospective jurors. It indicated that such a requirement would nullify
time-honored customs of examining jurors at the trial.
The court, in Smithers, did hold, however, that where a plaintiff can
show reasonable grounds for believing that a prospective juror has a
financial interest in the cause, the plaintiff should be allowed to propound questions on voir dire to determine whether the juror does, in
fact, have an interest in any outside insurance company, or any other
3
company which might defend an action similar to the case being tried.
This rule is predicated upon a showing by the plaintiff that he was acting
4
in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.
But more than mere speculation or surmise is required to satisfy the
good faith requirement necessary to support interrogation of a prospective
juror regarding his possible pecuniary interest in the case. In Wheeler v.
Rudek, 5 the plaintiff had filed a pretrial motion for permission to interrogate the prospective jurors regarding their insurance interests and
had declared by affidavit that reasonable grounds existed for the request.6
Neither justification for, nor explanation of, the reasonable grounds were
set forth in the affidavit. The Illinois Supreme Court held that it was
error to allow the plaintiff to interrogate the venire regarding interest
in an insurance company without a more positive showing of the juror's
interest than mere speculation and surmise.7
Similarly, the defendant in Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement
Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N.E.2d 499 (1938).
3 In Smithers v. Henriquez, supra note 2, the plaintiff knew that the case was being
defended by the insurance company's counsel, and received permission to propound one
question which might determine if any of the venire had such knowledge or an interest
in the company. This was deemed sufficient to satisfy the good faith requirement. A
decision for the plaintiff was affirmed.
4 Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947). Accord: Kavanaugh v. Parret,
379 Ill. 273, 40 N.E.2d 500 (1942); Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Co., 378 Ill.
180, 37 N.E.2d 801, (1941); Smithers v. Henriquez, supra note 2. For a general discussion,
see 4 A.L.R.2d 748 and the note following.
5 Wheeler v. Rudek, supra note 4.
6 The motion was based upon the belief that the defendant held a public liability
insurance policy issued by a specified insurance company. It further stated that the
insurance company employed numerous persons in its offices and that interested persons
might be among those called into the venire.
7 The court reversed and remanded a verdict for the plaintiff.
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Co.,s stated under oath that the veniremen had no interest in the case.9
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded in the Edwards case that no reasonable grounds existed to justify the plaintiff's pre-trial request to interrogate
the veniremen regarding insurance interests.' 0
By way of contrast, the plaintiff in the Rains case made the required
positive showing of interest when, upon plaintiff's request, the defendant
disclosed that seventeen members of the venire were policyholders in the
Country Mutual Insurance Company.
Likewise, mere information and belief will not constitute sufficient
grounds upon which to question a prospective juror concerning his pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding. In Kavanaugh v. Parret,"
a judgment for the plaintiff, which had been affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, was reversed because the only effect of the question propounded to the jurors was to advise them that an insurance company was
2
conducting the defense of the case.'
It should be noted that each of the foregoing cases can be distinguished
from the Rains case on the basis that the request to interrogate the jurors
was granted, whereas in Rains it was not. Furthermore, in all of the cases,
the defendant demonstrated that no member of the venire was either connected with the insurance company or assessible whereas, in Rains, the defendant indicated that seventeen of the venire were policyholders in a
mutual company.
In addition, the decision in Rains appears unusual even as to holdings
in other jurisdictions. For example, the Missouri Appellate Court has held
in Kendall v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America,'3 that it was
error for the trial court to deny the plaintiff's motion to dismiss for cause
any jurors who were policyholders in one of tl~e largest mutual insurance
companies in the world, when the request, based upon reliable information
8 Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Co., supra note 4.
9 The plaintiff had made a pre-trial request for permission to interrogate the venire
regarding any interest they might have in the insurance company which admittedly was
conducting the defendant's defense. However, the pre-trial request was oral, no affidavit
having been filed, and no showing made giving any reason why such interrogation was
necessary. When the request was made, the defendant stated under oath that the policyholders were not liable for assessments to pay judgments, and, further, that none of the
employees or agents of the insurance company were on the panel of jurors in attendance.
The request was granted.
10 The court reversed and remanded a verdict for the plaintiff.
11 Kavanaugh v. Parret, 397 Ill. 273, 40 N.E.2d 500 (1942).
12 The plaintiff filed a pre-trial motion requesting permission to interrogate the
venire along insurance lines, based upon information and belief. The defendant filed a
counter-affidavit to the effect that the insurance company was not a mutual company
and that the policyholders were not subject to assessment, and, further, that no person
connected with the insurance company, in any way, was on the jury list. On voir dire,
the plaintiff asked his question, and requested that the veniremen raise their right hands
if the answer was affirmative. None so indicated.
13 319 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1958).
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and made in good faith, was made outside the presence of the venire.
However, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled the decision and disallowed the dismissal for cause holding that the jurors' ability to render
a fair and impartial verdict would not be unduly affected merely because
14
they were policyholders in a world-wide insurance company.
Thus, the Illinois Appellate Court has, by its holding in the Rains case,
provided another weapon to combat the resources of insurance carriers.
It is a matter of common knowledge that most individuals, and especially
those who own and operate automobiles, carry liability insurance.' 5 It will,
therefore, be necessary for the plaintiff to request a list of policyholders, as
well as stockholders or other financially interested persons, from the defendant's insurance carrier. Upon receipt of such a list, the plaintiff would
then necessarily assume the onerous task, suggested in Smithers,'6 of crosschecking the list against the venire roster before voir dire. He then would
present his motion to dismiss, for cause, any jurors found to be policyholders in the defendant's mutual insurance company. This, of course,
would eliminate only one group of interested jurors, but the plaintiff would
still have available the right to ask questions of the remaining veniremen
regarding any other possible financial interest they might have in the case.
Clearly then, the effect of the decision in the Rains case will be to preserve the plaintiff's limited number of peremptory challenges and enable
him to utilize more fully those challenges against other prospective jurors
who might, in his judgment, rule adversely.
JOHN A. SMITH
Kendall v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America, 327 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1959).
15 Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Iil. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947).
16 Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N.E2d 499 (1938).
14

